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Dec. 1944] PEOPLE lJ. Wl/,SON 
(Crim. Ro. 4G72. In Bank. Dec. 1, 1944.) 
TIlE PEOPLE, ~pondcnt, Y. l\IAE A. WILSO:N", 
Appellant. 
:..:41 
[lJ Abortion - Evidence - Corrobwration.-In II. prosecution for 
abortion, the victim's testimony rcquires corroboration under 
Pen. Codc, § 1108. 
[2J ld.-Evidence-Corroboration-Husband's Testimony.-In a 
prosecution for abortion, the testimony of the victim's hus-
band requires corroboration if hC' was an accomplice of defend-
ant. (Pen. Code, ~ l1lJ.) 
[3] ld. - Evidence-Corrobol'ation-Husband as Accomplice.-In 
a prosecution for abortion, the mere fact that the victim's 
husband accompanied his wife to dE'fendant's office did not 
make him an accomplice requiring {'orroborntion of his tes-
timony. 
[4J ld. - Evidence-:..Corroboration"':"'Husband as Accomplice.-In 
a prosecution for abortion, thE' victim's hushand was an ac-
complicE' within Pen. Code. ~ l1ll. where he provided the fE'e 
for the abortion, assurC'd defenoant that thE' money was 
ready and inquired of thE' lattE'r how long- h(' would havE' to 
wait; where he statE'd that he knew that the purpose of his 
wifc's appointment with defendant "'as an abortion; and "'here, 
on b('inQ' asked whC'th('r hE' took his wife to defendant's office 
for thAt purpOSE'. h(' Ans"'erE'o thAt "that was more or less up 
to her." Such eyidenc(' show('d flInt he played an active part 
in the transaction and WAS therefore subject to prosecntion 
for th(' offensE' with ,~hil'h d('fenilant WA~ charged. 
[5] ld.-Evidence-Corroboration.-In a prosecution for abortion, 
the victim anil h('r hmb:mil {'01110 corroborate ('nl'h other's 
testimon.\' . 
[6] ld.-Evidence-Corroboration-Woman Submitting to Abor-
tion as Accomplice.-A marricd woman submitting to an abor-
tion, bdng sllbjc(>t to pro~eclltion under Pen. Code, § 275, and 
not undE'r ~ 274. is not an accomplice of the person performinf:t 
the operation or of the hl1~bano. who are subject to prosecution 
nndE'r ~ 274. 
llJ See 1 Cal.Jur. 111; 1 Am.Jur. 151. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-7,10,11] Ahortion, § 6; (8] Criminal 
Law. § 577(2); [9] Criminal Law, §~ 577, 577(6); [12, 15] Crimi-
nal Law, § 555; [13, 14) Criminal Law. § 561(1); [161 Criminal 
Law, §§ 284, 1382(29); [17] Criminal Law, § 1432; [18J Wit-
nesses, § 120(2); (19) Criminal Law, '1349(3). 
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[7a, 7b] Id. - Evidence - Corroboration. - In a prosecution for 
abortion, the victim's tC'stimoll,v Ivlc(luatC'lv corrohoratet] that 
of her husband, and his festimony sufficiently corroborated 
hers, where shl' testifiC'tl thnt. dl?fentlant performed an illegal 
operat.ion on hC'r, alld gnve detail~ a:s to making an appoint-
ment for the opC'ratioll, ascertaining- t.'iH' f('e. going to defend-
ant's office with hl'r hushand. their intervicw with d<>fendant 
assuring the latter that they had the money, thl' husband 
being told t.o wait outside the office, and feeling experienced 
during the operation, and her physical condition both before 
and after the operation; and where the husband's testimony 
was substantially the same with respect to the interview with 
defendant and to his wife's health. 
[8] Criminal Law-Accomplice Testimony-CorroboratioD-Requi-
sites.-Ro long as evidence to corroborate the testimony of an 
8C'complice creates more than a suspicion of guilt, it is suf-
ficient even thoug-h it be slight and, when standing by itself. 
entitl<>d to hnt littll' consid<>ration. 
[9] Id.-Accomplice Testimony-Corroboration-Requisiies.-In a 
criminal prosecution. the evidence necessary to corroborate 
the testimony of an accomplice may consist of defendant's 
testimony and inferences therefrom, as well as·inferences from 
the circumstances surrounding the criminal transaction; it 
need not establish the precise facts testified to by the witness 
whose t('stimony it supports. 
[10] Abortion-Evidence-Su1Ii.ciency.-In a prosecution for abol--
tion, inferences connecting defendant with the abortion which, 
according to the expert opinion of a physician; had occurred, 
conld justifiedly be drawn from def!:!ndant's failure to k('l'p 
writtpn records. 
[11] Id.-Evidence-Corroboration.-In a prosecution for abortion, 
the victim's testimony as to the use of instruments in the 
operation does not need spe!'ial corroboration. 
[12] Criminal Law-Evidence-Expert Testimony-Physical Con-
dition.-A physician may take into consideration a patient's 
declarations as to her condition, if they are nt'cessary to enabl!' 
him in connection with his own ohservations to form an opin-
ion as to the patient's past or present physical or mental COil· 
dition; and in a prost'l!ution for abortion. the fact that 1\ 
physician's opinion as to absence of necessity for an abortion 
is partly based on the case history obtained from the victim 
does not make such opinion inadmissible. 
[18] Id.-Evidence-Expert Testimony-Hypothetical Questions. 
-In obta.ining opinion evidence from an expert. the trial court 
[13] See 8 OaLJur. 162; 20 Am.Jur. 662. 
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should prevent the usc of misleaoing- or unfair hypothetical 
questions, permitting only questions that sufficiently specify 
the assumptions on which they arc based and contain only 
such assumptions as do no~('ontn!('lid t.h(> wei!!'ht of the evi-
dence in th(> caRe. 
[14] Id.--Evidence--Expert Testimony-Hypothetical Questions. 
-While each hypothesis containen in a question ashd an ex-
pert witness should have some evident?e to support it. it is not 
necessary that the question include a statement of all the 
evidence in the case. The statement may assume facts within 
the limits of the evidence. not unfairly assembled, on which 
the expert's opinion is required, and considerahle latitude 
must be allowed in the choice of facts as to the basis on which 
to frame a hypothetical question. 
[15] Id.-Evidence--Expert Testimony-Ma.tters Directly in Issue. 
-There is no hard and fast rule that an expert cannot be 
asked a question that coincides with the ultimate issue in the 
case; and in a prosecution for abortion, questions asked a 
physician as to whether in his opinion the abortion was spon-
taneous or induced, or whether it was performed in order to 
preserve the victim's life. may be proper where there is no 
other practicable way of framin/! the questions if the witness' 
expert knowledge is to be obtainn. 
[16] Id.-Tria.I-ltebuttal Testimony: Appeal-Ha.nnless and Re-
versible Error-Evidence of Other Oft'enses.-In a prosecution 
for abortion, testimony concerning defendant's statement to 
an arresting officer that c('rtain sllrgical instruments had never 
been returned to her following their seizure at the time of a 
prior arrest, was admissible. not for the purpose of proving 
defendant's prior arrest. bnt to rehut the inferenc(' that no 
instruments were used. which could be drawn from the fact 
that the arresting offiC'ers were unable to find such instruments 
in defendant's office. The importance of this evidence in the 
proof of the People's case outweighed any prejudiee to de-
fendant from th(' reference to her former arrest. 
[17] Id.-Instructions-Limiting Evidence.-In a prosecution for 
abortion. where te!ltimonv concern in!!' defendant's statement 
to an arresting officer th'at certain surgical instruments had 
never been returned to her followin/! a prior arrest was ad-
mitted for the purpose of rebutting an inference that no in-
struments were used, defendant was entitled to have the jury 
instructed as to the limited purpose for which the evidence 
was admittl'd. 
[18]. Witnesses - Cross-exa.mination - Defendants in Criminal 
Cases.-In a prosecution for abortion, where defendant testi-
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victim was in defendant's oflfc'e lind what fce was charged for 
the alleged E'xllmination, it wa!l 'Proper to cross-examine de-
fendant with respert to a telephone conversation preceding 
thE' appointment and other facts and ci,"cumstances surround-. 
ing the transaction, including 8 failure to enter the ftlleged 
fee' in a record as is cllstomary. 
[19J Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless a.nd Reversible Error-In-
dictment and Information. - In a criminal prosecution, no 
prejudicial error could result from denial of a motion to set 
aside the information because there was no evidence at the 
preliminary hearing of reasonable or probable cause. as re-
quired by Pen. Code. § 995. where the proof submitted at the 
trial was sufficient, not only to show reasonable and probable 
cause. but to support the verdict. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new ~rial. 
Harold B. Landreth, Judge. Afiirmed. 
Prosecution for abortion. Judgment of conviction affirmed. 
Morris Lavine for Appellant. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Frank Richards and 
T. G. Negrich, Deputies Attorney General, Fred N. Howser, 
District Attorney, and Jere J. Sullivan, Deputy District At-
torney, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appealR from a judgment eon-
victing her of· the crime of abortion and from an order deny-
ing her motion for a new trial. The prol'lecuting witness, Mrs. 
Marcella Anderson. gave the followiIig te!'ltimony: On August 
2.1943. defendant performed an illegal operation on her. She 
made the appointment fot' the operation with defendant over 
the telephone. and defendant Itfolked her how many periods 
she had missed and !'Itated that the fee would be $100. She 
went to defendant'!'! office with her hURband. Defendant in-
quired whether they had the money and received an affirma-
tive answer. She then told the hU!!band to wait outside the 
office because her patient.'! were women. After her hURband 
left. Mrs. Anderson paid the defendant $100 and asked de-
fendant what method she used. Defendant replied that it 
was a curettement. During the operation. which took about 
S5 minutes, the witness lay on a table while defendant worked 
) 
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between her legs, an~she could not ::lee whether defendant 
used an instrument. She felt something. inserted into her 
vagina, however, and also felt a painful scraping and pulling 
inside her body. She heard metallic sounds, caused by the 
different thing!-; that she had lelt inside her body. as they 
were laid on the table and picked up again. She felt well 
when sjle went to defendant but very weak when she met her 
husband in the building after leaving defendant's office. When 
she reached home she went to bed with a fever and in great 
pain. During the second night following the operation she 
was brought to a hospital. Her Busband's testimony was sub-
stantially the same with respect to the interview with de-
fendant before he left defendant's office to wait for his wife 
and with respect to his wife's health before and after her stay 
in defendant's office. He te..<;tified that he reassured defendant 
that the money was at hand when she inquired about the 
money and that he asked defendant how long it would take 
and was advised by her that she could not tell; that it might 
be thirty minutes or three hours. His testimony differed from 
that of his wife as to the date she entered the hospital. He 
•. +nt("l thnt it \Val" the night of August 7th to August 8th. 
Dr. Malone, the physician who attended Mrs. Anderson dur-
ldg lie,' twelve days in the hospital, testified that he examined 
her after her arrival in the hospital on the morning of Au-
gust 4th, that she was running a temperature, that her uterus 
was enlarged, that he found a body remaining therein, and 
that the cervix was effaced. He stated that this effacement 
indicated that the patient was about to lose the pregnancy 
conception in her uterus. He further testified that it was his 
opinion, based on his observations and the case history ob-
tained from Mrs. Anderson when she was under his care that 
an abortion was induced by outside interference while she 
was in a stage of pregnancy of about two and a half or three 
months, and that the abortion was inevitable. Defendant. 
testifying in her own behalf. denied that she performed an 
abortion, claiming that she merely examined Mrs. Anderson 
but could not complete the examination and was therefore 
unable to discern whether Mrs. Anderson was pregnant. She 
testified that Rhe charged $10 for the examination but that 
she did not keep written records, and she was unable to pro-
duce a written record of the fee. 
Defendant contends that there was not sufficient evidence 
that an abortion was committed or that it was performed by 
) 
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thc use of all instrument. If the verdict can legally be based 
on the testimony of the three .witnesses, it is clearly supported 
by the evidence. Defendant~ontcnds, however, that the testi-
mony of Mrs. Anderson and her husband was not sufficiently 
corroborated and that part of Dr. Malone's testimony was 
inadmissible. ' 
[1] Mrs. Anderson~ testimony required corroboration 
under section 1108 of the Penal Code, which provides that the 
testimony of the woman upon whom an abortion has been per-
formed must be corroborated by other evidence. [2] Mr. 
Anderson's testimony required corroboration if he was an 
accomplice of defendant. (Pen. Code, § 1111.) [3] The mere 
fact that he accompanied his wife to defendant's office does 
not make him an accomplice. (People v. Balkwell, 143 Cal. 
259,261 [76 P. 1017]; People v. Brewer, 19 Cal.App. 742, 746 
[127 P. 808]; People v. Seiffert, 81 Cal. App. 195, 198 [253 P. 
189].) [4] Mr. Anderson, however, also provided the $100 
fee for the abortion and had a conversation with defendant 
in which he assured her that the money was ready -and in-
quired of her how long he would have to wait, thus showing 
his intention to facilitate the commission of the crime by being 
at hand to take his wife home. He stated that he knew the 
purpose of his wife's appointment with defendant was an 
abortion. When he was asked whether he took his wife to 
defendant's office for the purpose of an abortion he answered 
that "that was more or less up to her." The evidence shows 
that he played an active part in the transaction and was there-
fore subject to prosecution for the offense with which de-
fendant was charged (Pen. Code. § 31; People v. Shaw, 17 
Ca1.2d 778.799 [112 P.2d 241]), and was therefore an accom" 
plice within the definition of section 1111 of the Penal Code. 
(People v. Clapp, 24 Ca1.2d 835, 838 (151 P.2d 237].) 
[5] Mr. and Mrs. Anderson could corroborate each other's 
testimony. [6] Mrs. Anderson. as the woman on whom the 
crime of abortion was committed was subject to prosecution, 
not under section 274 of the Penal Code prescribing punish-
ment for abortion, but only under section 275 of the Penal 
Code, and was therefore not an accomplice of defendant or 
the husband who were subject to prosecution under section 
274. (People v. Clapp, supra.) [7a] The wife's testimony 
I\dequately corroborated that of her husband. His testimony 
was also ~llfficient to corroborate hers even if it be assumed 
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like that required by llection,l1l1 with re:spect to accomplices, 
tend to connect the defendant with the offense. [8] So long 
as corroborating ev~encc creates more than a suspicion of 
guilt, it is sufficient even though it "be slight and, when stand-
ing by itself, entitled to but little consideration." (People v. 
Negm, 208 ·Cal. 64, 69 [280 ~. 354]; People v. Dorrance, 65 
Cal.App.2d 125, 130 [150 P.2d 10] j People v. Shaw, supra, at 
p. 802.) [9] It may consist of testimony of the defendant and 
inferences therefrom as well as inferences from the circum-
stances surrounding the criminal transaction (People v. Negra, 
supra; People v. (la.rne1·, 60 Cal.App.2d 63 [140 P.2d 146]; 
People v . . Dorrance, supra; Commonwealth v. Follansbee, 155 
Mass. 274' [29 N.E. 471]; Commonwealth v. Fenno, 134 Mass. 
217 j see 1 C.J .S: 338), and it need not establish the precise 
facts testified to by the witness whose testimony it supports. 
(People v. Negra, supra; People v. Lee, 81 Ca1.App. 49, 53 [252 
P. 763); People v. Dorrance, supra.) [7b] Mr. Anderson's 
conversation with defendant, and the latter's inquiry about the 
money and her statement that he might have to wait thirty 
minutes or three hours indicate something more serious than 
a routine examination. His observation that his wife was well 
when she entered defendant's office but ill when she left lends 
support to the inference that defendant brought about this 
change in Mrs. Anderson's condition. [10] Further infer· 
ences connecting defendant with the abortion, which, accord-
ing to the expert opinion of Dr. Malone, had Occurred, could 
justifiably be drawn from defendant's failure to keep written 
records. [11] Mrs. Anderson's testimony as to the use of 
instruments does not need special corroboration. (People v. 
SlItitherman, 58 Cal.App.2d 121, 123 [135 P.2d 674]; People 
v. Lorraine, 28 CaLApp.2d 50, 53 [81 P.2d 1004]; People v. 
Thompson, 16 Cal.App. 748, 750 [117 P. 1033].) 
Defendant contends that the following opinion evidence was 
improperly elicited from Dr. Malone: "Q. From your exami-
nation of this case, this patient, Mrs. Anderson, and from the 
ease history that you took. did you form an opinion as to 
whether her abortion was spontaneous or induced' A. It was 
my opinion that the abortion was induced ...• Q. Doctor, 
assuming for, the purpose of this case that an abortion is per-
formed on Mrs. Anderson on August 2nd, 1943, and that you 
examined her within a few days after it happened, on August 
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beelJ performed on Mrs. Anderson for the purpose of preserv-
ing her life, would the c~ditjons requiring that Rbortion be 
observable on August 4th T ••• A. At the time I examined 
the patient. Mrs. All!leJ'soll. I found 110 evidencc that a thera 
peutir abortion was necessary. Q. ... .. Then, in your opiniOJI. 
Doc·tor, you would say that from your examination of Mrs 
AnucT'son, the abortion was not pcrformed in order to pre· 
serve her life, is that correct T A. That is correct." Defendant 
attacks the admission of this testimony on the grounds that 
the questions called for answers based in part on the case 
history, namely, declarations of the patient, rather than on 
the observations of the physician, that they allowed the expert 
to make a determination that it was the sole province of the 
jury to make. and that the facts assumed were not proved. 
[12] The fact that Dr. Malone's opinion was partly based 
on the case history obtained from Mrs. Anderson does not make 
it inadmissible. It is settled tliat a physician may take into 
consideration a patient's declarations as to his conditi()n, if 
t.hey are necessary to enable him in connection with his own 
observations to form an opinion as to the patient's past or 
present ph~Tsical or mental condition. (People v. Shattuck, 
109 Cal. 673, 678 f42 P. 315]: Groat v. Walkup Drayage etc. 
('0., 14 Cal.App.2d 350. ::J57 f58 P.2d 200]: Wt770ughby v. 
Zylstra, 5 Cal.App.2d 297. 300 [42 P.2d 685J: Tierney v. 
Charles Nelson Co., 19 Cal.App.2d 34. 37 [64 P.2d 1150]; see 
6 Wigmore. Evidence (3d ed.) § 1722(1'): 67 A.TJ.R. ]0: 80 
A.L.R. 1527: 130 A.L.R. 977.) 
The method of obtaining opinion evidence from an expert 
h;v hypothetical questions is· unsatisfactory (see 2 Wigmore, 
Evidence (3d ed.) § 686; Hulbert, Psychiatric Testimony in 
Probate Proceedings, 2 Law and Contemporary Problems, 548, 
554). but it is at present the least objectionable known to the 
law. (People v. Le Doux, 155 Cal. 535, 554 [102 P. 517].) 
[13] The trial court, however, should prevent the use of mis-
leading or unfair hypothetical questions, permitting only ques-
tions that sufficiently specify the assumptions on which they 
are based and contain only BUch assumptions as do not contra-
dict the weight of the evidence in the case. (Christiansen v. 
Hollings, 44 Cal.App.2d 332, 348 [112 P.2d 723]; Weaver v. 
Shell Co., 34 Cal.App.2d 713 [94 P.2d 364J ; Bickford v. Law-
son, 27 Ca1.App.2d 416. 426 [81 P.2d 2161; Grat'Cs v. Union 
Oil Co., 36 Cal.App. 766, 770 [173 P. 618]; Estate of Gould, 
) 
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188 Cal. 353, 356 [20G P. 457 J.) [14] While each hypothe-
sis containcd in the (/fiestiol1 should have some evidence to 
sUPI>Ol't "it, it is not necessary tl18t the question include a 
statement of all the evidence in the case. The statement 
may assume facts within the 'limits of the evidence. not 
nnfairly as;;embleu. UPOIl which the opinion of the expert is 
requircd. and considerablelatitnde mm;t be allowed ill tl)(' 
choice of facts as to the basil' upon which to frame a hypo· 
thetical (lUestion. (Treadwell v. Nickel, 194 Cal. 24~~, 267 [22H 
P. 25]; Forbis v. Holzman, 5 Ca1.2d 407, 410 155 P.2(1 20]]; 
Mil'ich v. Bolsinger, 53 Cal.App.2d 103, 117 [127 P.2d 6301; 
Chl-istiansen v Hollings, supra.) All facts assumed in pl·OSC· 
cuting counsel's questions in the present case were sustaine(l 
by the evidence exeept the assumed fact that the abortion was 
performed for the preservation of Mrs. Anderson's life. This 
fact, however, if true. would have been favorable to defendant, 
[15] There is no hard and fast rule that the expert cannot 
be asked a question that coincides with the ultimate issue in 
the case "We think the true rule is that admissibility de-
pends on the nature of the issue and the circumstances of the 
case, there being a large element of judicial discretion in-
volved. . .. Oftentimes an opinion may be received on 8 
simple ultimate issue, even when it is the sole one, as for 
example where the issue is the value of an article, or the 
sanity of a person; because it cannot be further simplified 
and cannot be fully tried without hearing opinions from those 
in better position to form them than the jury can be placen 
in." (Hamt1ton v. United States, 73 F.2d 357, 358-9; Rackoff 
v. United States, 78 F.2d 671, 673; see, also, Nolan v. Nolan, 
155 Cal. 476, 480 [101 P. 520, 132 Am.St.Rep. 99,17 Ann.Cas. 
1066]; Giraudi v. Electric Imp. Co., 107 Cal. 120, 127 [40 P. 
108,48 Am.St.Rep. 114, 28 L.R.A. 596]; Sim v. Weeks, 7 Cal. 
App.2d 28, 39 [45 P.2d 350]; Huru:it v. Prudential Ins. 
Co., 45 Cal.App.2d 74, 82 [113 P.2d 691]; 78 AJ.J.R. 755; 
4 Wigmore Evjdence (3d ed.) § 1921; 7 N.C.L.Rev. 320.) In 
the present case there was no other practicable. way of 
framing the questions if they were to serve the purpose of 
obtaining the benefit of the witness's expert knowledge as to 
matters on which enlightenment of the jury by the expert waf! 
proper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1870(9); Moore v. Norwood, 41 
Cal.App.2d 359, 366 [106 P.2d 939] ; El1{1e1kinn v. Car7son, 13 
. Ca1.2d 216, 221 [88 P.2d 695] ; Patterson v. Marcus, 203 Cal. 
) 
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550, 553 [265 lY'222]; Perkins v. Trueblood, 180 Cal. 437, 
443 l181 P. G-!2J.) 
[16] Defendant contenu;; that prejudicial error was com-
mitteu uy the trial comt 'in denying defendant's motion to 
strike testimony of Maynard Young, an investigator for the 
Btate Medical Board, on the ground that evidence of another 
crime was inadmissible. The witness was asked by counsel for 
the People whether he had a conversation with defendant 
when he arrested her in bel' office. He testified that while 
arresting her he asked defendant where the instruments were 
that she used in cur-ettements, and that she replied that those 
instruments had never been returned to her after they had 
been taken from her at the time of a previous arrest. Defend-
ant's statement to the arresting officer, however, was ad-
missible, not for the purpose of proving a former arrest of 
defendant, but to rebut the inference that no instruments 
were used, which could be drawn from the fact that the ar-
resting officers at the time of the arrest were unable to find 
in defendant's office instruments that are regularly used for 
abortions of the type in question. The jury could infer from 
the fact that such instruments had been taken from defendant 
at a previous arrest that she would be careful not to keep new 
instruments in her office, or tbat sbe might have performed 
the abortion with instruments other than those regularly used. 
The latter inference finds support in defendant's inability to 
complete the abortion. The importance of this evidence in the 
proof of the People's case outweighed any prejudice to the 
defendant from the reference to her former arrest. (Adkins 
v. Brett, 184 Cal. 252, 258 [193 P. 251].) [17] Defendant 
was entitled, however, to have the jury instructed as to the 
limited purpose for which the evidence was admitted (Adkins 
v. Brett, supra, at p. 259), but she does not contend that she 
requested such an instruction and that it was denied. 
[18] Defendant contends that her constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination was violated on the ground that the 
questions admitted on her cross-examination with respect to 
the telephone conversation preceding the appointment, the 
keeping of records by defendant, and her questioning !vII's. 
Anderson about the missing of periods, were outside the scope 
of allowable cross-examination. A defendant may be cross-
examined under section 1323 of the Penal Code "as to all 
matters about which he was examined in chief." Here, de-
fendant was examined by her counsel as to what happened 
) 
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when Mrs. Anderson was in defendant's office and what fee 
defendant charged .-ror tlle alleged examination. This direct 
examination opened the door to inquiry as to preparatory 
steps concel'ning the nppointment and other facts and circum-
stances surrounding the trammction, including the failure to 
enter the alleged fee in a record as is customary. (Ashley v. 
Rivera, 220 Cal. 75, 79 [29 P.2d 199]; People v. Kynette, 15 
Ca1.2d 731,753 [104 P.2d 794]; People v. Smith, 43 Cal.App. 
2d 110, 116 [110 P.2d 472].)' 
[19] Defendant contendH that there was no evidence at the 
preliminary hearing of reasonable or probable cause, as re-
quired by section 995 of the Penal Code, and that therefore 
her motion to set aside the information was improperly de-
nied. Defendant has failed to point out in what respect the 
proof at that time was insuffiGient to show reasonable or prob-
able cause. (See People v. Novell, 54 Cal.App.2d 621, 623 [129 
P.2d 453].) If error was committed, it was not prejudicial, 
for the proof submitted at the trial was sufficient, not only to 
show reasonable and probable cause, but to support the verdict. 
The judgment and order are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., 
concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. By the testimony of Mrs. An-
derson she was not merely an innocent victim upon whom an 
abortion was attempted without her knowledge or consent; 
she was on the contrary an active participant, wilfully aiding 
and n betting in the project. Therefore she was guilty as a 
principal and as an accomplice of the defendant in violating 
section 274 of the Penal Code, if in fact any crime was proved. 
and not section 275. The latter section (275) is obviously 
designed primarily, if not exclusively. to cover situations not 
covered by the former. The latter section is intended to punish 
hvo things: (1) the solicitation and taking of drugs by a 
woman, on her own account and without the necessity for 
participatjon by any other person. "with intent thereby to 
procure a miscarriage"; (2) the passive submission, with like 
intent, to an operation. It does not cover active participation 
in the yiolation of section 274. That section (274). coupled 
with the provisions of sections 31 and 971 of the same code. 
covers the arth'ities of hoth Mr. Imd Mrs. Anderson and the 
defendant. They are all accomplices and all principals in a 
~~ vim&. 
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The experience and wisdom of mankind, particularly of 
those dealing with judicial trials, accumulated throu~h many 
generations, have brought the conclusion that "evidence of 
an accomplice, comfng from a tainted source, the witness 
being, first, an infamous man, from his own ('onfession of 
guilt, and, second, a man usually testifying in the hope of 
favor or the expectatioll of immunity, was not entitled to the 
same consideration as the evidence of a clean man." (People 
v. Coffey (1911),161 Cal. 433, 438 (119 P. 901, 39 L.R.A.N.S. 
704).) In recognition of this conclusion the Legislature of 
California has laid down the rule that" A conviction cannot 
be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be 
corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect 
the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the 
corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commis-
sion of the offense or the circumstances thereof." (Pen. Code, 
§ 1111.) 
The majority opinion here, as in People v. Clapp (1944),24 
Cal.2d 835 [151 P.2d 237], ascribes to section 275 a potency 
which I do not believe is justified by that section's language 
or purpose Such construction appears to me to subvert the 
clear meaning of sections 274. 31 and 971 of the Penal Code, 
and to accomplish the circumvention of the salutary provisions 
of section 1111. Such strained constructions benefit neither 
law nor justice. The Legislature gave further evidence of its 
concern that there be no convictions in abortion cases upon 
tainted evidence alone-which may be wholly false and given 
for ulterior purposes-by the enactment of section n08 of the 
Penal Code. If that section and section 1111 were given effect 
in this case the judgment could not stand. Regardless of our 
feeling as to the likelihood of guilt of the defendant in this 
or any other particular case it is our duty to scrupulously 
uphold the law as enacted by the State. 
For the reasons above stated and for the additional con-
siderations depicted in my dissenting opinion in People v. 
Clapp (1944), supra, 24 C8.1.2d 840, the judgment should be 
reversed. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
28, 1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing. 
